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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 950769 
vs. : 
LARRY BRUCE DIETZ, 
aka THOMAS LEONARD, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this case 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1994). 
This is an appeal from sentencing on one count of theft, a 
second degree felony, Utah Code Ann. Sec. 76-6-412 (1953 as 
amended), in the First Judicial District Court in and for Box Elder 
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Ben H. Hadfield presiding. 
STATEMENT QF THE ISSUE PRESENTED AND 
STANDARD OF APPELATE REVIEW 
The following issue is presented on appeal: 
Did the trial court err in sentencing defendant to a term of 
one to fifteen years on a second degree felony where the law at the 
time of sentencing provided that he be sentenced consistent with a 
class A misdemeanor? 
A trial court's legal conclusions will be reversed only if 
shown to be clearly erroneous. State v. Delif 861 P.2d 431, 433 
(Utah 1993) . 
1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The defendant identifies the following constitutional 
provisions, statutes, ordinances and rules as those "whose 
interpretation is determinative" within the meaning of Utah R. App. 
P. 24(a)(6): 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-6-412 (1953 as amended): 
(1) Theft of property and services as provided in this 
chapter shall be punishable: . . . (c) as a class A 
misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen is or 
exceeds $300 but is less than $1,000. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On April 5, 1995, defendant was charged with two counts of 
forgery, a second degree felony. (R. at 1) . On May 4, 1995, an 
amended information was filed, charging defendant with one count of 
theft by deception, a second degree felony under Section 76-4-404, 
Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended). (R. at 2). On May 15, 1995, 
defendant entered a plea of guilty to this charge and was sentenced 
to a term of one to fifteen years in the Utah State Prison. (R. at 
30, 39). On or about June 13, 1995, the defendant filed a motion 
to withdraw his plea (R. at 22) , and a hearing was held on October 
16, 1995. (R. at 72). At said hearing defendant's motion was 
dismissed at his request (R. at 93), and on October 20, 1995, 
defendant filed a Motion for Resentencing. (R. at 51). That Motion 
was denied on October 31, 1995 (R. at 61), and defendant filed a 
Notice of Appeal on November 13, 1995. (R. at 68) . 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
During the calendar year 1994, defendant purchased $3 
denomination money orders and altered them, resulting in money 
2 
orders which appeared to have the denomination of $100. (R. at 30-
31). He then used the altered money orders to purchase small items 
at various businesses and receive the difference between the $100 
denomination and the purchase price. (R. at 31). On April 5, 1995, 
defendant was charged with two counts of second degree forgery. (R. 
at 1). On May 4, 1995, an amended information was filed charging 
defendant with one count of second degree theft by deception under 
Section 76-6-404 Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended) (R. at 2) 
This charge incorporated three separate crimes with amounts of $100 
each. (R. at 30, 35). 
On May 15, 1995, defendant entered a plea of guilty to the 
second degree felony, with the agreement that with the plea no 
other charges would be filed in Box Elder County for the same 
activity which may have occurred during the calendar year 1994. (R. 
at 30, 39) . Prior to defendant's entry of a guilty plea, the Utah 
State Legislature amended Section 76-6-412, Utah Code Annotated 
(1953 as amended), to reclassify the offense to which defendant 
entered a guilty plea as a class A misdemeanor. Said amendment was 
effective May 1, 1995. 
On the same day he entered his guilty plea, defendant was 
sentenced to a term of one to fifteen years in the Utah State 
Prison. (R. at 42-3). Defendant's trial counsel was apparently 
unaware of the recent legislative change, as he stated to the 
court, prior to sentencing, that he thought "a term of one to 15, 
as required by statute, would be adequate for the sentence." (R. 
at 41). 
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Upon learning that the legislature had changed the law 
regarding defendant's case, trial counsel filed a motion to 
withdraw the guilty plea (R. at 22) , and a hearing was held on 
October 16, 1995. (R. at 72). At said hearing, trial counsel 
argued that if he had been aware that the statute changed the 
offense from a second degree felony to a third degree felony he 
would not have advised his client to plead guilty. (R. at 73-74).2 
The prosecuting attorney countered that the guilty plea was not the 
problem, but rather the question was one of sentencing, and further 
that the defendant would be entitled to be sentenced according to 
the lesser third degree felony. (R. at 78). 
Defense counsel then pointed out to the court that the 
prosecution could only come up with a maximum of $700 in value for 
the thefts, and that "we either have a misdemeanor class A theft by 
deception or a series of third degree felonies, but we don't have 
any seconds." (R. at 79-80). The trial court stated that it would 
"either grant the motion to withdraw the guilty plea and allow the 
State to proceed with the prosecution [on the third degree 
felonies] or, by stipulation of the parties, . . . vacate the 
sentencing and simply revisit that issue as perhaps a more 
efficient way to get this resolved." (R. at 84). 
There was a failed attempt to stipulate that defendant be 
sentenced on a third degree felony, but the prosecutor wanted 
defendant to waive his right to appeal the sentencing. (R. at 94) . 
The trial court dismissed the motion to withdraw the guilty plea at 
1
 It appears the original basis for filing the motion to 
withdraw defendant's guilty plea was the legislative change of 
the forgery statute, which is not directly at issue in this 
appeal. 
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defendant's request. (R. at 93). 
On October 20, 1995, defendant filed a Motion for 
Resentencing, and attached copies of Section 76-6-412, Utah Code 
Annotated (1953 as amended), and of State v. Saxton, 519 P.2d 1340 
(Utah 1974) . The Motion for Resentencing was denied on October 31, 
1995. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court clearly erred in sentencing defendant to a 
term of one to fifteen years in prison when, at the time of 
sentencing, Utah Code Annotated Section 76-6-412 (1953 as amended) 
provided that defendant's offense was punishable as a class A 
misdemeanor. The Utah Supreme Court, in the cases of Belt v. 
Turner. 483 P.2d 425 (Utah 1971), State v. Tapp. 490 P.2d 334 (Utah 
1971), and State v. Saxton. 519 P.2d 1340 (Utah 1974), has made it 
clear that defendants are to be sentenced according to the law 
existing at the time sentence is imposed. The trial court in this 
case did not do that, and this Court should remand this case for 
resentencing in accordance with the appropriate law. 
ARGUMENT 
The trial court was clearly in error when it sentenced 
defendant to a term of one to fifteen years on his guilty plea. On 
May 15, 1995, Defendant entered a plea of guilty to one count of 
second degree felony theft by deception, a count which included 
three separate incidents of altering money orders. Each of the 
three money orders was altered to reflect a face value of $100, 
rather than the original $3. Added together they total $600.2 
2While inconsequential, it was argued below that the total 
value of the thefts was $600, but the argument failed to take 
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Effective May 1, 1995, the Utah State Legislature amended Section 
76-6-412, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended), making defendant's 
crime a class A misdemeanor, not a second degree felony. 
(1) Theft of property and services as provided 
in this chapter shall be punishable: 
(c) as a class A misdemeanor if the value of 
the property stolen is or exceeds $300 but is 
less than $1,000; . . . 
The Utah Supreme Court has been very clear on the issue of 
what law is to be applied at sentencing. In 1971, the Court 
stated: 
. . . if [an amended law] becomes effective 
before a final judgment of sentence is 
pronounced, the amendment controls the 
punishment to be meted out, . . . . 
Belt v. Turner. 483 P.2d 425, 426 (Utah 1971). The Court further 
stated that "where a particular punishment is prescribed, no other 
may be imposed." Id. 
Later in 1971, the Utah Supreme Court articulated the policy 
considerations underlying this principle: 
it is the prerogative of the 
legislature, expressing the will of the 
people, to fix the penalties for crimes; and 
the courts should give effect to the enactment 
and the effective date thereof as so declared. 
• * • 
. . . to insist on the prior existing harsher 
penalty is a refusal to accept and keep 
abreast of the process which has been 
continuing over the years of ameliorating and 
modifying the treatment of antisocial behavior 
by changing the emphasis from vengeance and 
punishment to treatment and rehabilitation. 
In the same tenor are the time-honored rules 
of the criminal law generally favorable to one 
accused of crime: that in case of doubt or 
uncertainty as to the degree of crime, he is 
into account the fact that defendant originally purchased the 
money orders for $3 each. Thus, the correct figure should be 
$591. 
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entitled to the lesser; and correlated 
thereto: that as to an alternative between a 
severe or a lenient punishment, he is entitled 
to the latter. 
State v. Tapp. 490 P.2d 334, 335-6 (Utah 1971) (emphasis added) 
(footnotes omitted). The Court again confirmed this principle 
three years later in State v. Saxton. 519 P.2d 1340 (Utah 1974). 
In the present case, the State, through the prosecuting 
attorney, acknowledged that the defendant is entitled to the 
benefit of the lesser punishment at the time of sentencing. (R. at 
78) . The trial court, however, in its memorandum decision, barely 
acknowledges defendant's "claim" that the offense had been amended. 
Interestingly, the trial court does not explain why the amended 
statute is inapplicable, but rather spends its energy making an 
unsuccessful attempt to distinguish this case from Saxton by 
stating that ff[i]n Saxton a Jury Trial was held, and . . . [i]n the 
present case, the Defendant, through counsel, negotiated a 
comprehensive agreement . . .•" (R. at 63). 
It is irrelevant how the defendant came to be convicted of the 
offense; no matter the circumstance, trial courts are obligated to 
sentence defendants according to the law in existence at the time 
sentence is imposed. 
CONCLUSION 
In short, the trial court was clearly in error in not applying 
the law as it existed at the time of sentencing. Defendant should 
have been sentenced consistent with a class A misdemeanor. 
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Wherefore, defendant respectfully prays that this Court will 
remand his case for resentencing in accordance with the appropriate 
law. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J ? / day of February, 1996. 
MICHAEL 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE QF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I mailed or hand-delivered a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing, with postage prepaid, to Jan Graham, 
Attorney General, Attorney for Appellee, 23 6 State Capitol, SLC UT 
84114, this *2/ day of February, 1996. 
^^<^t n^L 
Attorney at Law 
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ADDENDUM A 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF 
BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs, 
LARRY BRUCE DIETZ, 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT AND COMMITMENT 
Case NO. <frsirr/rysft 
On May 15, 1995, appeared Jon J. Bunderson, Box Elder County 
Attorney representing the State of Utah, and the defendant 
appeared in person and represented by counsel, Kent Snider. 
IT IS ADJUDGED that the defendant has been convicted by 
X his plea of guilty a jury the Court 
of the offense(s) of: Theft by Deception, a Felony of the 2nd 
Degree as charged in the amended information; and the Court 
having asked the defendant whether he has anything to say why 
Judgment should not be pronounced, and no sufficient cause to the 
contrary being shown or appearing to the Court, 
IT IS ADJUDGED that the defendant is guilty as charged and 
convicted, and, 
IT IS FURTHER ADJUDGED that the defendant is hereby 
committed to the Utah State Prison and the Sheriff of Box Elder 
County is directed to take him into custody and deliver him to 
the Warden of the Utah State Prison to serve a term of not less 
than one (1) nor more than fifteen (15) years to run concurrent 
MIC&OFItMEO (R. 18) 
with any other Utah convictions and any Federal convictions. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendant pay restitution as 
determined by Adult Probation and Parole and/or the board of 
pardons, on all checks issued by him in Box Elder County during 
1994. The defendant may request a restitution hearing if he 
disputes the amount of restitution imposed. The defendant is 
ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $2,500.00 with credit 
against said fine for any restitution actually paid. IT IS 
FURTHER ORDERED that the original of this Judgment and Commitment 
shall be attested by the Clerk of the Court and that a certified 
copy hereof be delivered to said Sheriff or other qualified 
officer and that the copy serve as the Commitment of the 
defendant and as the Warrant for the Sheriff in taking into 
custody, detaining and delivering said defendant. 
DATED this /£ day of Ala., 1 9 ^ ^ . 
(R. 19) 
ADDENDUM B 
! i)l MOV 0 1 1 S S 5 ||! 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOX ELDER, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
PLAINTIFF, 
vs. 
LARRY BRUCE DIETZ 
aka THOMAS LEONARD 
DEFENDANT. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 951000059 
HONORABLE BEN H. HADFIELD 
This matter comes before the Court pursuant to the Defendant's Motion For 
Resentencing. Prior to filing this Motion, the Defendant had timely filed a Motion To 
Withdraw Plea. At a hearing on October 16, 1995, with the Defendant personally present, 
the Defendant, through his attorney, directed that the Motion To Withdraw Plea should itself 
be withdrawn. The Court advised the Defendant that it was die Court's intention to grant the 
Motion To Withdraw Plea, but if the Defendant withdrew the Motion, die Court no longer 
had that option. After conferring with counsel, the Motion To Withdraw Plea was 
voluntarily withdrawn by the Defendant. 
( R . 61) 
Memorandum Decision 
Case No. 951000059 
Page 2 
The Defendant's guilty plea was a result of negotiations with the County Attorney. 
Relevant portions of the transcript of the hearing on May 15, 1995 include the following: 
Mr. Bunderson: Actually, your Honor, I've prepared an amended Information, if 
Mr. Dietz is prepared to enter a plea of guilty to it. I'd make a 
motion to file that. I sent a copy to counsel on May 5th. I 
have alleged a new single count of theft by deception, a Felony 
of the second degree. It combines all of the counts in Box 
Elder County during 1994. We're aware of three. I suspect 
there may be more. 
Mr. Snider: Part of the deal is that if any one else files additional 
complaints, he would have to pay full restitution, but this would 
resolve all of the checks arising from this period of time issued 
by Mr. Dietz. 
(Transcript Page 3, Lines 11 - 23) 
Mr. Bunderson: Basically, what Mr. Dietz does is, as a method of being able to 
forge Money Orders, he buys $3.00 denomination Money 
Orders under phony names, and then forges the Money Order to 
make it $100 Money Order, and then purchases something. He 
did that at the three places alleged in the Information, all of 
which happened to be in Tremonton. We believe he did more 
than that, and he has admitted to doing, privately anyway, 
admitted to doing more than just those three places in Box Elder 
County during 1994, which would cause this to rise, if they are 
all lumped together, to the appropriate level for a second degree 
Felony. He was charged earlier with multiple second degree 
Felonies, but because of recent legislative changes, it is 
appropriate to lump them all together and make a single second 
degree. 
(R. 6 2 ) 
Memorandum Decision 
Case No. 951000059 
Page 3 
The Court: 
Mr. Dietz: 
The Court: 
Mr. Dietz: 
Is that statement essentially correct as to what occurred, Mr. 
Dietz? 
That's true, your Honor. 
Alright. The maximum penalties for a second degree are a term 
of 1 - 15 years in the Utah State Prison, and a fine of up to 
$10,000.00. Do you understand that, Mr. Dietz? 
I understand that. 
(Transcript Page 8, Lines 5-25; Page 9, Lines 1 - 3) 
The Motion For Resentencing claims that prior to Defendant's entry of plea, the Utah 
State Legislature amended 76-6-412 which reclassified the current offense as a Class A 
Misdemeanor. Defendant has attached a copy of the opinion in State vs Garv R. Saxton 
519 P.2d 1340, (Utah 1974). In that case, the Supreme Court required the Defendant to be 
resentenced with the benefit of the lesser punishment imposed by the intervening statutory 
change. The Court finds significant differences between Saxton and the present case. In 
Saxton a Jury Trial was held, and the Defendant was convicted of a specifically charged 
crime based upon the evidence presented at trial. In the present case, the Defendant, through 
counsel, negotiated a comprehensive agreement whereby not only currently pending charges 
against the Defendant were dismissed, but also all potential forgery charges relating to Box 
Elder County for the year 1994 were precluded from being filed, in exchange for 
Defendant's guilty plea to a single, second degree Felony.. 
(R. 6 3 ) 
Memorandum Decision 
Case No. 951000059 
Page 4 
After review of the file and the hearing transcript, this Court is of the opinion that the 
Defendant, who, at the time of sentencing was on federal probation, was an informed and 
educated Defendant, had adequate opportunity to confer with counsel, and made a 
comprehensive settlement of all pending and potential charges against him by entering a 
guilty plea to a single second degree Felony. The Court finds the opinion in State vs Saxton 
inapplicable to the present circumstances. The Defendant's Motion For Resentencing is 
denied. 
DATED this 3 1 day of October, 1995. 
(R. 6 4 ) 
Case No: 951000059 
Certificate of Mailing 
I certify that on the Jj / day of &C4T. H £ T , iSSfl' 
I sent by first class mail a true and correct copy of the 
attached document to the following: 
JON J. BUNDER50N 
Atty for Plaintiff 
4 5 NORTH 1ST EAST 
BRIGHAM CITY UT 84302 
KENT E SNIDER 
Atty for Defendant 
256 8 WASHINGTON BOULEVARD 
SUITE 102 
OGDEN UT 84401 
District Court Clerk 
By: 
(R. 65) 
ADDENDUM C 
1 information in open court? 
2 MR . DIETZ : Yes. 
3 THE COURT: There are two separate informations 
4 pending. There is case number 941-436 and also 
5 951-145. Mr. Snider, you indicate that there is a 
6 resolution of these charges? 
7 MR. SNIDER: That is correct, Your Honor. Mr. 
8 Dietz is currently charged with, I believe, three 
9 second degree felonies. The State has agreed to allow 
10 him to plead guilty to one second degree felony. 
11 MR. BUNDERSON: Actually, Your Honor, I've 
12 prepared an amended information, if Mr. Dietz is 
13 prepared to enter a plea of guilty to it. I'd make a 
14 motion to file that. I sent a copy to counsel on May 
15 5th. I have alleged a new single count of theft by 
16 deception, a felony of the second degree. It combines 
17 all of the counts in Box Elder County during 1994. 
18 We're aware of three. I suspect there may be more. 
19 MR. SNIDER: Part of the deal is that if anyone 
20 else files additional complaints that he would have to 
21 pay full restitution, but this would resolve all of 
22 the checks arising from this period of time issued by 
23 Mr. Dietz . 
24 THE COURT: All right. Give me some time frames. 
25 What period of time? 
MR. BUNDERSON: 1994 
THE COURT: Calendar year 1994? 
MR. DIETZ: I wrote six checks in Tremonton, 
Utah . 
5 | THE COURT: I just want to be sure that we all 
6 | understand what the agreement is. This single count 
7 | will resolve any charges that would have occurred in 
Box Elder County during 1994 with regards to 
9 I forger i e s ? 
10 | MR. SNIDER: That is correct, Your Honor. 
Ill MR. BUNDERSON: Actually, it's theft by 
12 | deception. I've alleged the Movie Machine, Lee's Auto 
13 1 Parts and Top Cut. I think there are others. He gets 
14 three dollar money orders and then has a machine that 
15 can change them to a hundred dollars and then buys 
16 five or ten dollar items in the store and pays for it 
17 with a hundred dollar money order and pockets the 
13 change. I've alleged it as theft by deception to 
19 simply lump all the charges together and make a second 
20 degree out of it. 
21 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Snider, is that the 
22 agreement ? 
23 MR. SNIDER: That is correct, Your Honor. 
24 THE COURT: All right. Do you want to present 
25 those documents, Mr. Bunderson? 
I'll ask Mr. Bunderson if he would give us 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
a brief summary of the evidence, the factual 
information, concerning this charge. 
MR. BUNDERSON: I think I already did, Your 
Honor. Basically what Mr. Dietz does is, as a method 
of being able to forge money orders, he buys three 
dollar denomination money orders under phony names and 
then forges the money order to make it a hundred 
dollar money order and then purchases something. He 
did that at the three places alleged in the 
information, all of which happened to be in Tremonton. 
We believe he did more than that, and he's admitted to 
doing, privately anyway, admitted to doing more than 
just those three places in Box Elder County during 
1994, which would cause this to rise, if they're all 
lumped together, to the appropriate level for a second 
degree felony. He was charged earlier with multiple 
second degree felonies, but because of recent 
legislative changes, it is appropriate to lump them 
all together and make a single second degree 
THE COURT: Is that statement essentially correct 
as to what occurred? 
MR. DIETZ: That's true, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. The maximum penalties for 
a second degree are a term of one to 15 years in the 
1 the decision at this point as to which I will do? 
2 MR. DIETZ: I understand that. 
3 MR. BUNDERSON: I think we discussed this. If 
4 not, I'd ask for an agreement on it, or a 
5 clarification. He's charged with theft by deception 
6 in Box Elder County during the year of 1994. We're 
7 only aware of three at the moment. There may be 
8 others surface when he talks to AP&P or if American 
9 J Express gets in touch with us. He should pay 
10 restitution and we would ask that he agree to and be 
11 ordered to pay restitution covering all of the crimes 
12 actually committed. That is, all theft by deception 
13 involving these checks in Box Elder County during 
14 1994 . 
15 THE COURT: Do you understand that, Mr. Dietz? 
16 MR. DIETZ: Yes. 
17 THE COURT: If there's a dispute as to how much 
18 is owed you are entitled to a separate hearing on that 
19 issue, but whatever the court determines you are 
20 required to pay. 
21 MR. DIETZ : Yes. 
22 THE COURT: As to the charge, then, theft by 
23 deception, a felony of the second degree, how do you 
24 plead? 
25 MR. DIETZ: I plead guilty. 
it to run concurrent with my federal time. I have to 
go back and do the federal time. 
MR. SNIDER: And that's before he can start doin 
the state time. It comes first. 
5 | THE COURT: Do you want me to go ahead and 
6 I sentence you this morning, though? 
7| (Pause in the proceedings.) 
8 | MR. SNIDER: He would prefer, Your Honor, to be 
9 | sentenced today. 
10 1 THE COURT: All right. Anything you want to say 
11 with regards to sentencing, Mr. Snider? 
12 MR. SNIDER: No, Your Honor. I believe that Mr. 
13 Dietz has outlined the factual basis for this and, 
14 under the circumstances, I think a term of one to 15, 
15 as required by statute, would be adequate for the 
16 s entence. 
17 The only thing we ask is that they do run 
18 concurrent based upon the State's recommendations. I 
19 think that would allow the federal system as well as 
20 the state system to determine what is in the best 
21 interest of society. If they determine they need to 
22 keep Mr. Dietz for an extended period of time, they 
23 certainly can do so under their guidelines. If they 
24 determine that he'll be more amenable to 
25 rehabilitation, rather than lock him into an 
1 indefinite term, I think the concurrent sentence would 
2 be adequate for everyone concerned. With that we're 
3 prepared to submit it. 
4 THE COURT: Mr. Dietz, is there anything you want 
5 to tell me? 
6 MR. DIETZ: Just that I'm sorry for what I've 
7 done. I'd like to get restitution and punishment 
8 going on this. 
9 MR. BUNDERSON: AP&P needs to be given the 
10 opportunity to interview him, or whatever they need to 
11 do, to prepare a post-sentence report. They do need 
12 to send something to the Board of Pardons. 
13 THE COURT: Yes. They'll need to prepare a PSI, 
14 even though he's sentenced this morning. As I 
15 understood you further, Mr. Bunderson, the State's 
16 recommendation is that it be concurrent? 
17 MR. BUNDERSON: Yes, with any Utah sentences or 
18 any federal sentences. 
19 THE COURT: Mr. Snider, any reason the court 
20 should not impose sentence at this time? 
21 MR. SNIDER: No, Your Honor, I know of no legal 
2 2 reason• 
23 THE COURT: For the offense of theft by 
24 deception, a second degree felony, it will be the 
25 judgment and sentence of the court that the defendant 
1 serve a term of one to 15 years in the Utah State 
2 prison. I will direct that that sentence be commenced 
3 immediately. It may be concurrent with any federal or 
4 other state sentences that currently are imposed upon 
5 the defendant. 
6 I'll assess a fine and surcharge in a 
7 total amount of $2500. I'll require the defendant to 
8 pay full restitution on the three victims alleged in 
9 J the amended information, as well as any other victims 
10 that are identified. The defendant is entitled to a 
11 restitution hearing if there's a dispute as to the 
12 amounts. I'll allow the defendant 100 percent credit 
13 against the fine for the amounts of restitution that 
14 he pays. 
15 MR. BUNDERSON: What's the fine? 
16 THE COURT: $2500 . 
17 MR. BUNDERSON: Is the concurrent issue, then, 
18 dealing with just Utah sentences and federal? 
19 THE COURT: Yes, both. Any questions, Mr. 
20 Snider? 
21 MR. SNIDER: No, Your Honor. 
22 THE COURT: That will be the judgment of the 
23 court. For the record, that goes into both files. 
24 Mr. Bunderson, you didn't place a file number on this 
25 amended information. 
another reason we chose to do it as a theft by-
deception. 
So the actual guilty plea, which is the 
issue before the court, really, I submit, is not a 
problem. It's still a second degree felony. The 
question is the sentencing. At this point he admitted 
that there were six checks just in Tremonton, Utah. 
We charged for the entire calendar year of 1994. Now, 
just so the record is clear, admittedly I do not have 
in my file, nor am I aware of, checks sufficient to 
get us to the new second degree felony theft level. I 
believe that's 3 5,0 00 for second degree felonies. I 
would suspect, if he wrote six checks in Tremonton and 
we have one in Brigham City, that during the entire 
year of 1994, just in Box Elder County, we achieve the 
thousand dollar level for theft by deception of a — 
that"'s necessary for a third degree felony. 
But in any event, even if we went back and 
redid all this, he would stand trial on second degree 
felonies and if convicted would then plead — would 
then be entitled to be sentenced as third degree 
felonies. Under those circumstances, I submit there's 
really nothing wrong with the guilty plea. His basic 
complaint is the sentence. 
Perhaps, under those circumstances, 
1 I understanding what we have in the file and what we'd 
2 I be able to prove, in effect we could prove what we 
3 J originally charged, which would be three third degree 
4 felonies. And perhaps he'd be willing to just take a 
5 sentence., if the court thinks it's appropriate, to a 
6 third degree felony, or a series of third degree 
7 felonies, and just be done with it. I'll throw that 
8| out as one of the possibilites for the court to 
i 
! 
9! consider. 
10 1 THE COURT: Mr. Snider, do vo u want a minute to 
! 
11! visit with your client? It does appear that the court 
i 
12! has at least two options or two decisions facing it. 
13 
14 
15 
One, whether he should be allowed to withdraw his plea 
and, secondly, I could determine that the answer to 
that is no, but that he is entitled to be resentenced. 
16 1 Do you want to confer with your client and see if he 
17] has a position on that as to what you're requesting? 
i 
18 j MR. SNIDER: I will, Your Honor. Thank you for 
19 I the time. I need to point out, even assuming Mr. 
20! Bunderson's facts, T think Mr. Bunderson at this point 
21 I can only prove S 3 0 0 worth of theft by deception. I 
22 j think it would be three 3100 money orders. 
j 
2 3 j If we do take M r . B u n d e r s o n ' s f a c t s , w h i c h 
24 
25 
j would be six in Tremonton and one in Box Elder, I 
don't think that that -- that Mr. Bunderson has all 
those, but based on what the defendant has even 
admitted, that's only S 7 0 0 . That would still put him 
in a Class A misdemeanor theft by deception. So we 
either have a misdemeanor Class A threat by deception 
or a series of third degree felonies, but we don't 
have any seconds-
Let me talk to my client in regards to 
that, Your Honor, and determine whether or not we want 
to just have him resentenced appropriately under the 
cede as to what he pled guilty to, or whether or not 
the court would allow him to withdraw his plea. 
(Pause in the proceedings.) 
MR. SNIDER: Your Honor, Mr. Dietz's position is 
that the theft by deception, which he pled guilty to, 
is not supported by the facts for a second degree 
felony. In fact, all it is is a Class A misdemeanor. 
He would prefer to be sentenced to the charge which he 
has pled guilty to, which is a Class A misdemeanor. 
The issue becomes an issue of resentencing, not an 
issue of withdrawing his plea of guilty. 
MR, BUNDERSON: That's the relief they're asking, 
is to withdraw the guilty plea; and^that's the only 
relief, Your Honor, that they may be technically 
entitled to. 
What I suggested was a practical 
! vc the auestio n of whether he received 
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ADDENDUM D 
1 
76-6-412. Thel'l C lass i f ica t ion of offenses - Act io in I I ill I Lima^es against receiver 
of stolen property, 
I ^ g^H
 0f pr0perty and services as provided in this chapter shall be punishable: 
(a) as a felony of the second degree if the: 
(i i \ aiue of the property or services is or exceeds $5,000; 
(ii) property stolen is a firearm or an operable motor vehicle; 
(iii) actor is armed with a deadly weapon at the time of the tht 
(iv) property is stolen from the person of another; 
(b) as a felony of the third degree if the: 
(i) value of the property or services is or exceeds $i?0G0 but is less than $5?000; 
(ii) actor has been twice before convicted of theft, any robbery, or any burglary v ith intent t ;:> 
commit theft; or 
(iii) property taken is a stallion ma?e. coil gelding, vvw n-iiei. sieei. v\. lui!l ca;i sheep, 
goat, mule, jack, jenny, swine, or poultry; 
(c) as a class A misdemeanor if the v* » eu ; > 
than $1,000; or 
(d) as a class B misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen is less than $300, 
(2) Any person who has been injured by a violation of Subsection 76-6-408(1) may bring an 
action against any person mentioned in Subsection 76-6-408(2)(d) for three times the amount of 
actual damages, if any sustained by the plaintiff, costs of suit and reasonable attorneys' fees. 
History: C. 1953, 76-6-412, enacted by L. 1973, ch. 196, $ 76-6-412, ; 
1975, ch. 48, § 1; 1977, ch. 89, § 1; 1989, ch. 78, § 1; 1995, ch. 291. § 14. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1995 amendment, e! fe :::t! re I > la i I, i 
Subsections (1)(a)(i), (1)(b)(i), (1)(c), and (1)(d). 
Cross-References. Bus Passenger Safety Act, theft of baggage o, cargo, * 76-1C- .www. 
Civil liability for treble damages for theft of livestock, § 4-24-27. 
i"1"  ion:; ; r n iiivisi n i l i; 
Analysis 
Constitutionality. 
Construction. 
Determining degree of crime. 
Evidence. 
Instructions. 
Lesser included offenses. 
Livestock. 
Prior convictions. 
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